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CLARIFIG ENTRAPMENT
RONALD J. ALLEN," MEUSSA LUrRELL,** ANNE
KREEGER"
I. INTRODUCTION
The edges of the criminal law in the United States (and
elsewhere, but we concentrate on the United States in this pa-
per) are partially formed by various defenses that reflect in large
part the frailty of human nature. The commands to forgo vio-
lence will not constrain a person at risk of his own existence,
nor when loved ones are threatened, and some believe that it is
right that they not attempt to do so. Mandates to respect the
inviolability of personal property will not avail when bodily in-
tegrity is at stake, nor should they in the face of peril. And so
on. These defenses recognize that virtually anyone can be in-
duced to commit an otherwise illegal act when the ratio of po-
tential benefit to potential harm (expected return, in the
language of micro-economics) is high enough. So, too, with en-
trapment. Entrapment merely completes the picture of human
motivation by including financial and emotional issues within
the set of motivations that can lead to exculpation. At its deep-
est level, entrapment, like many other criminal defenses, thus
simply recognizes that, as situations become increasingly skewed
from the conventional, they become increasingly inadequate
* John Henry Wigmore Professor, Northwestern University School of Law. We
have received very helpful comments on drafts of this paper from Judge Richard Pos-
ner, from Professors Dan Polsby, William Stuntz, Michael Seidman, Roger Park, and
Jonathan Carlson, and from the attendees of the Belfast Conference on The Role of
t&e TrialJudge in Criminal Proceedings.
**J.D. expected 1999, Northwestern University School of Law.
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justifications for, and less accurate predictors of the utility of,
criminal sanctions.
Yet, unlike most other criminal defenses, controversy over
the very nature of entrapment continues unabated. As is well
known, in a series of cases the Supreme Court created the de-
fense. Perhaps the circumstances of its creation contributed to
the confused state of the law today. When the Supreme Court
in Sorrells v. United States1 first recognized entrapment as a de-
fense in federal criminal law, it struggled to find the authority to
do so. As Sorrells was decided in 1932, one might have expected
the Court to have found its authority in substantive due process.
But the right to the entrapment defense, unlike the right to
contract, was hardly a tradition in Anglo-American jurispru-
dence. Instead, the Court concluded that Congress in enacting
the law in question did not intend for it to apply to the en-
trapped.2 The concurring opinion of Justice Roberts argued
that the defense should have been based on the supervisory
powers of the court.3 Both Sorrells' opinions assumed that en-
trapment was self-explanatory and that it was wrong. Both failed
to clearly delineate the contours of the defense, probably be-
cause the only issue in Sorrells was the Court's authority to per-
mit the defense in the absence of a legislative or constitutional
directive.4
The two tests in current use, born together in Sorrells, are
generally called the objective and the subjective tests (although
neither is inherently more objective-or subjective-than the
other). Both formulations require that the crime be induced,
or encouraged, by government agents. The subjective test asks,
"Was the defendant predisposed to commit the crime when he
' 287 U.S. 435 (1932). Entrapment had previously been recognized by some lower
federal courts, see, for example, Butts v. United States, 273 F. 35, 38 (8th Cir. 1921);
Woo Wai v. United States, 223 F. 412 (9th Cir. 1915), and by at least one Supreme
Court dissent, Casey v. United States, 276 U.S. 413, 421 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing). By 1955 almost every state had recognized the defense. Roger Park, The En-
trapment Controversy, 60 MINN. L. REV. 163, 164 n.1 (1976).
2 Sorres, 287 U.S. at 448.
S Id- at 457 (Roberts,J., concurring).
' For an excellent discussion of this topic, see Jonathan C. Carlson, The Act Re-
quirement and the Foundations of the Entrapment Defense, 73 VA. L REv. 1011 (1987).
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was approached by the government agent," while the objective
test asks, "Did the government's encouragement of crime ex-
ceed acceptable limits?" The subjective test, the test advanced
by the Sorrells majority, has prevailed in federal criminal law;
many states have adopted some version of the objective test.5
Controversy persists over many issues, in particular the relative
advantages of the two tests, their respective meaning, and sub-
sidiary issues, in particular why entrapment does not extend to
entrapment by a private party.
6
The controversy over entrapment has attracted much schol-
arly attention, and our collective understanding of the various
issues has much advanced as a result. Of the many excellent
analyses, three stand out as particularly penetrating: the articles
by Professors Carlton and Park previously cited, and that of Pro-
fessor Seidman. We build on those works, a general knowledge
of which is assumed here, in an effort to clarify the nature of en-
trapment. We make the following points:
1. The controversy over the two versions of the test-the sub-
jective and objective-is quite beside the point, because the two
tests will virtually never lead to different results;
2. More than just beside the point, the controversy presup-
poses the existence of a fictional entity-predisposition. Be-
cause a necessary ingredient of the subjective version of the test
does not exist, the test, rather plainly, cannot be applied in any
way that allows useful propositions to be asserted about the exis-
tence of predisposition, except to assert its nonexistence. Be-
cause predisposition does not exist, no one is ever, under any
circumstances, "predisposed" to commit the crime; or alterna-
tively, everyone, under every conceivable circumstance, is pre-
disposed to commit the crime. Such is the consequence of
using false propositions in one's analysis, and in any event, the
point is that "predisposition" cannot sort anyone from anyone
else, and thus is useless as a tool designed forjust that purpose.
'See PAUL MARCUS, TE ENTRAPMENT DEFmNSE 669-706 (1995).
'See generally Park, supra note 1.
7 Louis Michael Seidman, The Supreme Court, Entrapment, and our CrminalJustice Di-
lemma, 1981 S. Cr. REV. 111.
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3. Something does usefully sort out individuals-whether
they responded to real world, market level inducements.
4. The emphasis on market level inducements as the key to
entrapment further clarifies whether entrapment should extend
to private entrapment behavior-it should.
5. The market level inducements argument explains the
cases, perhaps simply contingently so, but it explains them
nonetheless.
We develop these five points in turn.
II. ThE NoNExisTENT PRACnCAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE
SUBJECTIVE AND OBJECTIVE TESTS FOR ENTRAPMENT
If there were such a thing as "predisposition," the two cur-
rent tests for entrapment theoretically could reach different re-
sults. A "non-predisposed" individual could accept an
inducement insufficient under the objective test. Alternatively,
the police could direct a scheme violative of the objective test
against a person already predisposed. Professor Seidman has
argued that these theoretical possibilities are quite unlikely ever
to materialize. He is right, but we wish to make two corrections
to his analysis:
First, Professor Seidman asserts that:
[S]o long as one equates "predisposition" with a readiness to commit
crime, no definition of "predisposition" can be complete without an ar-
ticulation of the level of inducement to which a."predisposed" defendant
would respond. Furthermore, the "predisposed" cannot be distin-
guished from the "nondisposed" without focusing on the propriety of
the government's conduct-the very factor that the subjective approach
professes to ignore. This is true because a defendant who responds fa-
vorably to a "proper" inducement has thereby conclusively demonstrated
that he is disposed to crime when such an inducement is offered. It
would seem, then, that so long as government agents restrict themselves
to "proper" inducements, they run no risk of violating the entrapment
rules.'
The error here is in the implicit assertion that the level of
inducement is the only possible evidence of "predisposition." If
8 Id. at 118-19 (internal footnotes omitted).
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such a thing exists, there is no reason to believe that other
forms of evidence, such as statements of the defendant and so
on, may not exist to establish it, or its absence. The situation
clearly is relevant to inferring mental states, but it is not, as Pro-
fessor Seidman argues, "conclusive."
Second, Professor Seidman asserts that:
[T]he objective test in theory avoids analysis of the defendant's predis-
position and focuses, instead, exclusively on the propriety of the in-
ducement. That question, in turn, is determined by the likelihood,
objectively considered, that it would entrap only those ready and willing
to commit crime. But plainly that likelihood depends in large measure
on the group to whom the inducement is targeted. So long as the police
direct their attention toward only those likely to be predisposed, the risk
of entrapment, objectively considered, is small, and the inducement is,
therefore, presumably permissible. Thus, in most cases, both the objec-
tive and subjective approaches would permit an inducement, so long as
the defendant is predisposed. The two approaches would reach differ-
ent results only in the rare case where the police reasonably, but incor-
rectly, believe the defendant to be predisposed at the time the
inducement is offered.9
That inducement and predisposition are related is correct,
but, again assuming there is such a thing as predisposition, this
argument does not quite capture their relationship. The cen-
tral issue of the objective test is the appropriateness of the level
of inducement, not to whom it is directed. Professor Seidman's
argument is equivalent to the argument that excessive force can
be used to coerce a truthful confession from a guilty suspect, as
there is no risk that a wrongful conviction will result. In both
cases, the activity of the police is independent of the state of the
defendant, even if predictions as to how people in general
would react to specific levels of inducement determines in part
the appropriateness of inducements.
10
9 Id. at 119-20 (internal footnotes omitted).
10 Professor Seidman, in his very helpful comments on our paper, points out that
our argument is valid only to the extent that over-the-top police behavior is a wrong
in and of itself. We agree, and that is what we are assuming at this point in the paper.
We are doing so because that is how we read the cases on the "objective" test. This
section, remember, is demonstrating the practical insignificance of the difference be-
1999]
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Professor Seidman's arguments thus do not quite establish
the practical insignificance of the distinction between the two
tests, but another consideration does, one that captures the
pragmatic relationship between levels of inducement and "pre-
disposition." In all cases, a third party fact finder-judge or
jury-will be determining predisposition and appropriateness of
inducements. The obvious measure of the appropriateness of
inducements is how "innocent, nonpredisposed" individuals
would behave. What is shocking about over-the-top police be-
havior is its capacity to induce "innocent" people to commit il-
legal acts, but "innocent" must in turn refer to the person's
predisposition to commit those acts. But, the fact finder will
have no direct access to the individual's actual predisposition,
and thus can largely only speculate how a reasonable person
(which probably will reduce largely to the fact finder herself)
would behave. The epistemol6gical setting is thus that typically
the most cogent test of the appropriateness of levels of induce-
ment (that we can think of, at any rate) is its likely effect on rea-
sonable, nonpredisposed individuals. Consequently, the
"objective test" requires reference to the state of predisposition
of reasonable individuals, if not the defendant himself.
We now run essentially the same argument through the sub-
jective test. Again, fact finders will not have direct access to a
defendant's predisposition, which we have been assuming is a
state of mind or perhaps a statement of character. As Professor
Seidman suggests, the most salient evidence will be what this
person did in the actual setting, judged, however, by the third
party decision maker. But, thatjudgment again typically will be
made by appraising how a reasonable person, like the fact
-finder presumably, would have behaved in the setting at hand.
This, though, is exactly the same question that the fact finder
must consider in applying the objective test. Thus, in both
cases, the fact finder will generally, although admittedly perhaps
not always, be asking precisely the same question, which estab-




lishes the practical insignificance of the distinction between the
two tests.1
III. THE CONTROVERSY OVER THE TESTS FOR ENTRAPMENT
PRESUPPOSES THE EXISTENCE OF A FICTIONAL EN=[Y-
PREDISPOSITION
There is a deeper difficulty with the controversy over the
two tests for entrapment. The controversy is premised on the
existence of a real something-state of mind, character, what-
ever-that is referred to as "predisposition." This assumption is
false. We assume that there are a few people who would not
commit any criminal acts no matter what the provocation or en-
ticement. We will not refer further to such saintly, or mis-
guided, individuals. Everyone else, we assume, has a price.
That price may be quite high, for example because a person
puts a high value on her good name, but it exists. If this as-
sumption is true, then everyone except saints is predisposed to
commit crimes. But, that in turn means that "predisposition"
cannot usefully distinguish anyone from anyone else. The only
salient question is whether a person's price has been met, not
whether he has one, since by hypothesis everyone but the saintly
does.
The real point is that talk of "predisposition" is meaningless
and commits an existential fallacy. A person who takes the bait
has had his price met; a person who does not, has not. But, the
person who does not take the bait almost surely would take a
higher, even if greatly higher, bait. The failure to take this one
is evidence of his price, but not of predisposition.
12
The discussion in the cases of whether the defendant was a
willing participant, and whether the government implanted the
criminal design in the defendant or created the crime' s verge on
" There are well known procedural differences between the two tests, but these are
contingent. See Park, supra note 1. Thus, we ignore them.
,2 Professor Seidman may share this view. See Seidman, supra note 7, at 118. We
have difficulty sorting out the ontological and the epistemological in his argument.
We are reading him as making an epistemological point; if he is making an ontologi-
cal one, we would seem to be in agreement on the nonexistence of "predisposition."
's See, e.g., United States v. Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d 1196 (7th Cir. 1994) (en banc);
Seidman, supra note 7, at 117-19.
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the silly. The defendant is always "willing" (otherwise there
would be no need to rely on entrapment-duress would do)
and to our knowledge, the government has never physically
opened the brain of a defendant and "implanted" anything.
Perhaps the government implants criminal designs psychologi-
cally, but again, if so, it is always so for the government always
plays a causal role in the act. In all cases of police involvement,
and thus of potential entrapment, the act would not have oc-
curred as it did but for the involvement of the police-a tautol-
ogy if ever there were one. Nor does the objective test avoid this
point, just because it pragmatically operates upon the assump-
tion of the existence of predisposition as a real thing. Without
predisposition as a sorting mechanism, the objective test is root-
less.
The imagery in the entrapment cases of the government ac-
tively creating a criminal design or being part of the causal links
underlying an act obviously cannot distinguish any cases, be-
cause they will always be true. Thus all cases of police involve-
ment would either be cases of entrapment or no entrapment-
no criterion permitting distinctions emerges from this analysis.
There are other possibilities, however. Entrapment could
mean, but does not in the cases so far as we can tell, something
about character or about whether a person has already commit-
ted acts analogous to the one he is now charged with. The for-
mer falls under the weight of the general disinclination to
punish for character alone (but we return to this point below);
the latter is of little practical significance, for if we know this
person has committed similar acts in the past, little is to be
gained from entrapping him now. We can just prosecute based
on our knowledge of his previous behavior. If insufficient evi-
dence exists to prosecute him for those previous acts (they can-
not be established beyond reasonable doubt), catching him in a
scheme now is to punish him for his character.
IV. SOMETHING DOES USEFULLY SORT OUT INDivIDUALS-
WHETHER THEY RESPONDED TO MARKET LEVEL INDUCEMENTS
There are illegal as well as legal markets, legal and illegal
exchange and exchange rates, real world and extra-real world
414 [Vol. 89
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incentives. The most fruitful criterion of government induce-
ments we have been able to identify to sort out those who have a
plausible claim for exoneration is whether the inducements ex-
ceeded real world market rates, which includes both financial
and emotional markets. 4 If so, quite convincing claims for ex-
oneration can be made; if not, only weak claims can.
We assume, without regard to philosophical niceties, that
the primary relevant objectives of the criminal law are to deter
(general and specific), to incapacitate, and to rehabilitate (it is
pointless to discuss retribution. in this context). 5 None of these
objectives is likely to be accomplished by the punishment of an
individual who accepted an extra-market inducement to act.
The concern of deterrence surely is to reduce the occurrence of
criminal acts in the world we actually inhabit, not some hypo-
thetically different one.' That a person responds to extra-
,4For an implicit equating of "predisposition" with the market test, see ChiefJudge
Posner's opinion in United States v. Evans:
All this suggests a certain semantic disarray. But when we go behind words to policy, we
can see that something like predisposition, in the sense of inordinate willingness to par-
ticipate in criminal activity, must be the key inquiry, though as a verbal matter it could
be folded into inducement viewed as the government's really having causW in some
rich sense, the criminal activity to occur, as distinct from merely providing a convenient
occasion for it to occur. The centrality of predisposition can be seen by considering the
purpose of the doctrine of entrapment. It is to prevent the police from turning a law-
abiding person into a criminal. A law-abiding person is one who resists the temptations,
which abound in our society today, to commit crimes. Such a person can be induced to
commit a crime only by grave threats, by fraud (the police might persuade him that the
act they want him to commit is not criminal), or, in the usual case in which entrapment
is pleaded, by extraordinary promises-the sorts of promises that would blind the ordi-
nary person to his legal duties.... So if the police offered a derelict $100,000 to com-
mit a minor crime that he wouldn't have dreamed of committing for the usual gain that
such a crime could be expected to yield, and he accepted the offer and committed the
crime, that would be entrapment.
United States v. Evans:, 924 F.2d 714, 717 (7th Cir. 1991)(emphasis in origi-
nal) (citations omitted).
's See generally Carlson, supra note 4.
'6 As Professor Seidman helpfully points out, some theorists have speculated that
punishing acts taken with above market inducements may lead to benefits in the real
world. It is possible, of course, but sufficiently doubtful to not trouble us greatly.
Briefly, these arguments, and the reasons we are not troubled, are:
1. Any defense may reduce deterrence because of a criminal's belief that he will
be able to convince a fact finder that it applies to him. As there are numerous de-
fenses, the question here would be the marginal increase from entrapment. If the
defendant irrationally believed in his obfuscating power, that marginal increase must
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market prices is uninformative of how he will respond to market
prices, and thus is uninformative on the justification for inca-
pacitation.1 7 A person who accepts extra-market prices provides
evidence that indeed virtually everybody has a price, but not
that this person is in need of rehabilitation, given the world we
actually inhabit. The point generalized is that criminal acts oc-
cur in the real world, not an artificial one, and behavior in an
artificial world is largely uninformative of behavior in this one.
Obversely, if a person responded to market rates, all argu-
ments about the purpose of punishment run through: deter-
rence of this person and similarly situated ones is plausible, the
person has demonstrated the willingness to behave in an anti-
social fashion in this world, and he has demonstrated that his
utility function is in need of correction (rehabilitation).
Professor Seidman disagrees, and asserts that "[t]here is no
culpability reason to acquit a defendant simply because he re-
sponded to an inducement unlikely to be replicated and there-
surely be small, as other defenses would still exist allowing smoke to be manufac-
tured. If the criminal is rational, the question does not arise for the most part. Fi-
nally, it is unclear how this would work in the entrapment context in any event. A
criminal who harbors the thoughts necessary for this argument to work would seem-
ingly be aware that the inducement is an almost sure sign of governmental involve-
ment, and thus not take the bait.
2. Knowledge that the government is offering extra-market inducements will
cause people to steer clear of the line. To the contrary, it will cause people to respect
the line and reduce the deterrent efficacy of governmental efforts by signaling relia-
bly who government agents are. The comparison, remember, is between two worlds,
one possessing extra-market government inducements and one not.
3. The market may be unclear, and thus high bids may be encountered. True, but
if high bids are encountered in the real world as a natural occurrence, in our view it is
not entrapment to offer such bids precisely because they may be encountered in the
real world.
17 AsJudge Posner argued in United States v. Manzella, 791 F.2d 1263, 1269 (7th Cir.
1986):
The significance of this qualification is that if the inducement merely affects the timing
of the offense-inducing the criminal to commit it at a time and in a place where the
government can easily apprehend him and make a case against him-punishing the
criminal will, or at least may, reduce the crime rate, by taking out of circulation a person
who, had he not been caught, would have committed the same crime, only in different
circumstances, making it harder to catch him. But if the inducement was so great that it
tempted the person to commit a crime that he would not otherwise have committed,
punishing him will not reduce the crime rate; it will merely deflect law enforcement into
the sterile channel of causing criminal activity and then prosecuting the same activity.
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fore posed little danger. The culpability question is not whether
the defendant is likely to commit a crime, but why he is likely to
commit it." I8 The term "culpability" is undefined here, however.
If it refers to a justification for punishment for deterrence, in-
capacitative, or rehabilitative purposes, the argument is in error,
as demonstrated above. If it refers to retributive concepts, it is
also in error, since the induced defendant obviously commits no
"wrong" against another person in the sense that term is usually
employed, as Professor Carlson has demonstrated. 9 There is,
thus, no accepted notion of culpability applicable to a person
who accepts an extra-market inducement, and thus no "culpa-
bility" reason that we can see for punishing such person. 
°
The market test also answers the second of Professor Seid-
man's concerns:
I suspect that this fear of the government's power to create criminals
provides the ultimate answer to the entrapment puzzle. It is not an ob-
vious answer, however. It will not do to claim that entrapment is neces-
sary to prevent the executive from engaging in selective application of
the criminal sanction, because within broad limits, we tolerate precisely
this risk when the universe of potential criminals consists solely of per-
sons acting without government inducement. When the government
"Seidman, supra note 7, at 136 (emphasis omitted).
"Which is precisely Professor Carlson's concern. Carlson, supra note 4, at 1059-
66. Professor Seidman remarked to us that individuals are frequently punished for
inchoate crimes such as attempts, and that retributivists have no difficulty with this.
Indeed, he points out that one problem for some retributivists isjustifying the differ-
ence in punishment for attempts and consummated crimes where the attempt is for-
tuitously unsuccessful, a point made many years ago by one of our co-authors.
RonaldJ. Allen, Retribution in a Modern Penal Law: The Principle of Aggravated Harm, 25
BuFFALO L. REv. 1 (1975). The question here, though, is the slightly different one of
a retributive justification for an act causing no actual harm and that would not have
occurred in the real world. It is difficult for us to see a cogent retributivistjustifica-
tion in light of these conditions.
" Later in his paper, Professor Seidman returns to the point, asserting that "it
makes some sense to acquit defendants who succumb only to very large or attractive
inducements which are either unlikely to be replicated or likely to cause the average
person to succumb." Seidman, supra note 7, at 142. He rejects this because it is un-
clear to him "how... the court [is] to measure the social cost of a particular en-
forcement decision against the cost of the crime it is designed to combat." Id. at 143.
However, there is no necessary connection between these two points. The problem is
notjust waste of law enforcement resources, although that is a problem; the problem
in addition is the justification for penalizing a particular act. As we are trying to show,
the market test gives the best solution to that problem.
1999] 417
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chooses which shoplifters, pickpockets, and drug users to prosecute and
to jail, we regularly rely upon political checks to guard against abuse.
Why do these checks become suddenly inadequate when the class of po-
tential criminals is broader?
2'
The answer is quite simple. It is the difference between al-
locating limited resources to enforce the law against sets of indi-
viduals who are committing criminal acts in the real world, as
compared to investing those resources to induce individuals to
commit acts that they would not commit in the real world.
However, there are three difficulties:
First, markets do not always have uniform prices. True, and
the best that can be done is to require that the fact finder be
convinced that the inducement did not exceed the market rate,
whatever the variability of price in the relevant market may be.
Given what is at stake, our preference would be for proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt.
Second, would proving the market involve difficult proof
questions? Perhaps so, but not insurmountable ones. Informa-
tion about illegal markets exists-as reflected by the news re-
ports of "drugs with a street value of.. ." Presumably police
agencies engaging in inducing activity know the structure of the
markets they are dealing with, and could provide expert testi-
mony. Moreover, a requirement of presenting such informa-
tion may act as a salutary constraint on police behavior, a tax on
"flying blind," as it were. And last, the proof questions must be
compared to those under the present tests. The subjective test
requires literally proof of the nonexistent, which is hardly an
2' Id. at 146 (internal footnotes omitted). Professor Seidman returns to the theme
later in his paper, with this series of questions, which seem to us to have quite clear
answers: "Is it not possible that defendants succumbing to certain temptations seem
less culpable because we can imagine persons with our life styles making a similar
choice?" Id. at 151. Exactly so, and as our life styles are not criminal in the real
world, we can see no reason to encourage the creation of artificial conditions merely
to permit punishment to be imposed. "Is not our fear of government power to make
criminal really a fear that it will make the wrong people criminals?" Id. Again, exactly
so-it will make "criminal" those who are not and would not become criminals in the
real world. "Is not entrapment doctrine simply a means of regaining our distance
from those suffering punishment so that we can avoid the politically impossible task
of self-condemnation?" Id. No. We do not commit crimes in the real world, others
do. That is the crucial distinction.
[Vol. 9
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obviously superior alternative, and the objective test is entirely
rootless, unless it is a badly articulated surrogate for the market
test.
Third, the market test would allow the first time offender to
be convicted, and to that extent is punishment for character.
True, but incomplete. All entrapment in an important sense in-
volves punishment for character. It almost invariably involves
governmental activity whose explicit purpose is social hygiene-
to clear the streets of individuals who have and will commit
crimes-and is usually targeted at types of criminality that can-
not easily be prosecuted in other ways, normally because of the
absence of complaining witnesses. This point may be sufficient
to condemn all governmental involvement in criminal acts, a
point we pursue no further. If governmental involvement is to
continue, the market test is by far a better criterion to employ
than the present incoherent reliance on predisposition, for it
identifies reliably those who are and are likely to be involved in
criminality under real conditions. Even a first time offender
who accepts the market rate for an act is very likely to have that
opportunity at some time, and thus to take it.
Our test is a modification of that originally proposed by Pro-
fessor Carlson. Rightly concerned about the diminished signifi-
cance of the act requirement in inducement situations,
Professor Carlson's test was designed to ensure that the goals of
the act requirement are satisfied:
Government-encouraged criminal conduct will not be punished unless
either: a) the encouraged conduct injured or seriously threatened to in-
jure the interests protected by the law in question, or b) the defendant
initiated the criminal act or transaction in response to an opportunity to
commit the crime which was neither uncommon nor excessive.2
Part b limits the government to providing an opportunity
for the target to initiate a criminal transaction; it is barred from
initiating the transaction itself
Professor Carlson's concerns are well taken, and his test for
the most part persuasive. Its only difficulties are considerable
" Carlson, supra note 4 at 1099-1100 (emphasis omitted).
1999] 419
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ambiguity in operation, and that it prohibits too much. It re-
quires distinguishing between creating an opportunity, which
the government can do, and initiating the act, which the gov-
emnment cannot do. How this line is drawn is quite unclear. In
addition, it is not the formal act of initiation that deprives gov-
ernment induced acts of their justificatory or explanatory
power; it is, as we argued above, that they sometimes exceed the
market rate, and thus are not explanatory of how the individual
would act in the real world. The market test, which as we say is a
modification of Professor Carlson's original proposal, captures
this point.
V. PRiVATE ENTRAPMENT
Although the precedent is thin, the conventional view is that the
entrapment defense does not extend to private entrapment.2 3
This controversy is further proof of the conceptual disarray
caused by the fiction of predisposition. The market test clarifies
the matter. If a person responds to an extra-market price, no
reliable inferences about that person can be made, except that
he, like most of us, has a price. The source of the extra-market
price is of no relevance to this inferential relationship, and thus
no distinctions should be drawn between private and govern-
ment inducements.
Chief Judge Posner, following the conventional arguments,
recently concluded to the contrary:
There is no defense of private entrapment. A person hired to commit a
crime cannot defend on the ground that the hirer offered him so much
money that it broke down his resistance. Such a plea is actually an ar-
gument for a heavier sentence, in order to offset the inducement. The
severe punishments that Congress has imposed for violation of the fed-
eral drug laws may reflect the profitability of drug trafficking: the more
profitable a crime, the more costly must the punishment be to the
criminal in order to deter him from committing it.24
Seidman, supra note 7, at 128 n.66.




Although we are a bit diffident about correcting the eco-
nomics ofJudge Posner, we respectfully suggest that he has con-
flated two different points here. The first is whether the
penalties are sufficient, given what the market is, and this is the
real point his comments address. The second is whether the
inducement actually given in the case is within the parameters
of what one reasonably would find in the real world. If it is not,
the response by the defendant yields no insight as to the accept-
ability of punishment. Being extra-market, it is highly unlikely
to be repeated or encountered again by this defendant or any-
one else, and thus is not adequate to ground criminal sanctions.
We should also mention that, with respect to private parties, the
probability of extra-market inducements is surely quite low.
Why would they exceed the market, an act equivalent to a chari-
table contribution? Surely the standard answer must be as a
scam or a setup. In any such case, the person running the scam
may evidence need of punishment, but essentially nothing is
learned about the pigeon.
The alternative, of course, is that the market theory explains
why private entrapment does not exist: If a private party offers
an inducement, that determines the relevant market. Perhaps
we compromise our discipline here, but we find this unhelpful.
It does not permit exoneration of an individual who would
never have committed a criminal act but for the outlandish of-
fer of another. It also neglects that mistakes about the market
can be made. Moreover, permitting the induced individual a
defense does not exonerate the inducer. To the extent an "ex-
tra-market" inducement is made by a private party, the anti-
social risks lie primarily with the one making the offer, who pre-
sumably always will be subject to some form of liability (e.g., at-
tempt, solicitation). In any event, perhaps this point
demonstrates a certain inconsistency in our argument, but we
prefer to be sensible about the matter.
1999]
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VI. THE MARKET LEVEL INDUCEMENTS ARGUMENT EXPLAINS THE
CASES, PERHAPS SIMPLY CONTINGENTLY So, BUT nT EXPLAINS THEM
NONETHELESS.
The Supreme Court's entrapment cases are somewhat of a
mess. This is not surprising, for they are premised on a fiction.
Interestingly, though, the market test is quite consistent with the
results in the cases, although it bears no relationship to their
rhetoric. It also explains and justifies the controversial decision
of the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Hollingswortho, recogniz-
ing a "positional" component to entrapment. We demonstrate
this consistency here, although we do not argue that ours is a
positive theory in any significant sense, although perhaps it is.
A. SYMPAThETIC AGENTS
The first Supreme Court cases to recognize the entrapment
defense involved agents who played upon the sympathies of ap-
parently unsophisticated targets.26 In Sorrells v. United States,2 the
agent had served in the same Army division as Sorrells during
World War One. On the basis of this connection, over the
course of several hours, the agent made several requests that the
target supply him with liquor, which Sorrells refused to do. Af-
ter considerable reminiscing about war-time experiences, Sor-
rells supplied the agent with a half-gallon of liquor, in violation
of the National Prohibition Act.28 In Sherman v. United States,
the agent, a recovering addict, befriended Sherman while both
were undergoing treatment for a heroin addiction. Convinced
that the agent was not responding to the treatment, and moved
by his apparent suffering, Sherman agreed to supply him with
heroin, in violation of federal narcotics laws, at no profit to him-
self.-"
"United States v. Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d 1196, 1203 (7th Cir. 1994) (en banc).
2In order, they were Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 439-40 (1935), and
Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 569, 372 (1958).
2287 U.S. 435 (1935).
2Id at 439-41.
"3 56 U.S. 369 (1958). ChiefJustice Warren wrote for the majority;Justice Frank-
furter concurred,joined by Justices Douglas, Harlan, and Brennan.
so Id. at 371.
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The majority in Sorrells did not find entrapment as a matter
of law, merely remanding the case for a new trial with instruc-
tions to the jury that entrapment would lie if Sorrells had not
been predisposed to sell illegal liquor.3 The majority in
Sherman, on the other hand, while agreeing that entrapment is
generally an issue for the jury, found that Sherman had been
entrapped as a matter of law.12 The concurrences in both cases
would have found entrapment as a matter of law based on the
application of an objective-type test.3
People often play upon one another's sympathies and
weaknesses. A rational (that is, naturally occurring) criminal,
working well within the market, might very easily present him-
self as a sympathetic character in order to persuade a target to
cooperate with him. Under the market test, then, a police agent
is allowed to do the same. However, rational criminals would
not repeatedly solicit individuals who have made it clear that
they are not interested, nor would they invest a great deal of
time to persuade someone to become a drug dealer when sellers
of street drugs are ubiquitous. Under the market test, the issue
would not be whether the agent played upon the defendant's
sympathies; rather, it would be whether a rational criminal
would have gone to such lengths to persuade him to change his
mind.
Applying the test to the facts of Sherman, the answer is no.
Although an actual addict would be likely to turn to another
addict, or to a recovering addict, as a source of drugs, it is un-
likely that he would be unable to secure drugs from another
source over the period involved in Sherman or that he would
persist in the manner that he did. He raised the emotional
stakes too high; it is highly unlikely that a rational criminal
would behave this way.
Under the market test, Sorrells was probably also en-
trapped, although it is a closer question, as the Court recog-
nized. As the Court put it:
s' Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 452.
32 Sheman, 356 U.S. at 373, 375-77.




[The] defendant had no previous disposition to commit [the offense]
but was an industrious, law-abiding citizen, and... the agent lured de-
fendant, otherwise innocent, to its commission by repeated and persis-
tent solicitation in which he succeeded by taking advantage of the
sentiment aroused by reminiscences of their experiences as companions
in arms in the World War.s4
Perhaps it is plausible that a rational criminal would behave
this way. If so, Sorrells should have been convicted; if not, he
should have been acquitted.
B. SUPPLYING CONTRABAND
The next major Supreme Court entrapment cases involved
agents supplying an essential ingredient to the target in order to
facilitate the target's production of an illegal item. The dissents
in these cases would have found the defendant to have been en-
trapped either under the objective test,3 or under due process.
3 6
The majorities found no entrapment on the basis of the defen-
dants' predisposition.3 7 The market test would find entrapment
in these cases only if the ingredient supplied by the agents,
whether contraband or not, was so difficult to obtain that nei-
ther the target nor a bona fide criminal interacting with the tar-
get would have been able to supply it.
In Russell v. United States, a government agent solicited Rus-
sell and several co-defendants to manufacture and supply him
with methamphetamine, in violation of federal narcotics laws.M
The government agent offered to provide the defendants with
phenyl-2-propanone, an ingredient essential to the manufacture
Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 441.
3See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 436 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting); iH
at 441, 450 (Stewart, J., dissenting); Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 497
(1976) (Brennan,J., dissenting).
Hampton, 425 U.S. at 497, 500 (Brennan,J., dissenting).
'7 In order they were Russell, 411 U.S. at 432-36; Hampton, 425 U.S. at 488-90 (plu-
rality opinion) (rejecting the due process defense); i& at 491, 491-93 (Powell, J., con-
curring) (leaving open the possibility of a due process or furnishing contraband
defense but holding that the defenses would not apply to the facts of the case).
3' Russell, 411 U.S. at 426 (1973).
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of methamphetamine. s9 Phenyl-2-propanone was not itself con-
traband, but was difficult to obtain since several sources of sup-
ply had stopped selling the chemical at the request of the
Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugsi ° The evidence in-
dicated, however, that Russell and his compatriots were able to
obtain it both before and after the agent supplied it to them.
Because the critical question was whether a criminal who might
have interacted with the defendant could have obtained the in-
gredient in order to supply it to him, Russell was not entrapped,
for he was able to obtain phenyl-2-propanone himself.
42
In Hampton v. United States, the petitioner claimed under-
cover agents had supplied him with heroin which he then sold,
at a profit, to other undercover agents.43 A majority of Supreme
Court justices held that any due process defense was not appli-
cable to such facts, and that, due to his conceded predisposi-
tion, he had not been entrapped under the subjective test." A
plurality went further and held that no due process defense was
applicable to claims of entrapment.4 The dissent argued that
under either the objective test or on due process principles, the
indictment ought to be dismissed. It proposed a test whereby
"conviction is barred as a matter of law where the subject of the
criminal charge is the sale of contraband provided to the de-
fendant by a government agent."
46
The facts considered by the Supreme Court were an amal-
gam of the evidence at trial, relying in part on testimony by the
defendant and in part on contradictory testimony by agents of
39 Id. at 425.
Iid. at 426-27.
41 Id. at 425-27.
42 i at 431-32.
Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 487 (1976).
14 Id. at 489-90 (plurality opinion); id. at 491-92 (Powell, J., concurring).
"s Id. at 488-89 (plurality opinion). The concurrence objected to the plurality
reaching the question of the very existence of a due process entrapment defense,
since the majority was agreed that such a defense, if it existed, would not apply to the
petitioner. The concurrence preferred, therefore, to leave open the question of
whether due process principles could ever apply to government encouragement. Id.
at 491-93 (Powell,J., concurring).
4I6 at 500 (Brennan,J., dissenting).
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the government.47 The scenario the Court considered was one
where an undercover agent both offers to supply contraband to
the target and offers to find buyers for that contraband. Under
the market test the issue is whether any rational criminal would
do this, and the answer is probably yes. Just as any wholesaler
might set up a distributor and help him initially to find custom-
ers, so might a drug dealer. Under the market test, then,
Hampton was not entrapped.
However, it is unlikely that a rational criminal would pro-
vide initially unwilling targets with everything necessary to the
commission of the crime. In Greene v. United States, for example,
the court found entrapment when a government agent offered
to supply the target with a still, a site, equipment, a phony still
operator, and sugar for the production of moonshine, and kept
the operation in business for several years.48 The market proba-
bly would not permit several years of manufacturing liquor at a
loss. Under that test, then, the court was correct to find that the
defendants were entrapped.
C.. ELABORATE SCHEMES
The most recent Supreme Court entrapment case was
United States v. Jacobson, in which two government agencies for
several years inundated Jacobson with mailings and solicitations
to purchase child pornography before he finally succumbed to
the encouragement and bought some illegal materials.
This case raises many interesting questions. The Supreme
Court analyzed the facts of Jacobson from the perspective of pre-
disposition under the subjective test.0 Under the market test,
by contrast, the issue would be whether a rational criminal, at-
7 The defendant claimed that a government informer had proposed selling coun-
terfeit heroin, which the government agent then supplied and arranged for the two
to sell to undercover agents. The Court found that the jury, in order to convict, must
have disbelieved Hampton's claim that he was unaware that the substance he sold was
in fact heroin. It considered, then, whether Hampton would be entitled to a modi-
fied entrapment instruction had an agent agreed to supply him with heroin and then
arranged to find buyers for it. Id. at 487 (plurality opinion).
0 454 F.2d 783, 786-87 (9th Cir. 1971).
503 U.S. 540, 540-48 (1992).
' Id at 549. See discussion supra, text accompanying note 4.
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tempting to find purchasers of contraband and to avoid detec-
tion by the government, would have solicited Jacobson in a
manner similar to that used by the government.
In order to persuade Jacobson to purchase contraband
reading material, the government did not simply solicit Jacob-
son to do so. Rather, an elaborate scheme was implemented.
Jacobson was invited to join organizations ostensibly dedicated
to repealing current laws concerning the possession of child
pornography. He was also sent phony sexual taste surveys invit-
ing him to reveal his preferences for, among other things, types
of pornography. After several years of such stuff, Jacobson pur-
chased contraband pornography.*" The Supreme Court, in ana-
lyzing these facts, held that Jacobson had not been shown to
have been predisposed to purchase this contraband at the time
the government initiated its sting operation, although he was
predisposed -to do so by the time he committed the crime for
which he was charged. Holding that it is entrapment for the
government to cause a person to be predisposed to commit the
illegal act which it then encourages him to commit, the majority
concluded thatJacobson had been entrapped . Whatever that
may mean.
Under the market test, the issue inJacobson is whether an ac-
tual distributor of child pornography would have engaged in a
solicitation scheme at all analogous to that used by the govern-
ment. No rational criminal would have directed such a mail
campaign at someone in Jacobson's position. Although we do
not know the pornography market, we assume it is similar to
other markets, and it seems unlikely that a distributor of con-
traband reading material would be able to develop potential
customers for several years before actually soliciting them to
purchase its product. Yet this is essentially what the government
did inJacobson. Hence under the rational criminal testJacobson
was entrapped.
3' at 547.




The most controversial recent case is United States v.
Hollingsworth.3 Chief Judge Posner, writing for a bare majority,
concluded that the Supreme Court in Jacobson had added a
"positional" element to the concept of predisposition in federal
entrapment law: "The defendant must be so situated by reason
of previous training or experience or occupation or acquain-
tances that it is likely that if the government had not induced
him to commit the crime some criminal would have done
so[.]"5 Otherwise, however quickly he snapped up the govern-
ment's bait, however slight the government's inducement, he
was not predisposed.
The Hollingsworth defendants were an orthodontist
(Pickard) and a businessman/farmer (Hollingsworth). In 1988,
the two decided to become international financiers, although
neither had training, contacts, or experience in international
banking. They formed a Virgin Islands corporation that ob-
tained two foreign banking licenses, one Grenadan. In 1990,
having failed to attract a single customer, the corporation de-
cided to sell its Grenadan license to raise capital. Pickard
placed an advertisement in USA Today.55 On the same day, U.S.
customs agent J. Thomas Rothrock attended a seminar on
money laundering. Knowing that foreign banks are sometimes
used for money laundering, Rothrock saw the ad and "assumed
that someone who wanted to sell one would possibly be inter-
ested in money laundering."56
Rothrock (the only respondent to the ad) contacted
Pickard, who offered a variety of lawful financial services as well
as two illegal banking schemes-one involving depositing the
money overseas, and the other, for which he was later charged,
an illegal "structuring" scheme, wherein a large sum of money is
divided among several banks to avoid federal reporting re-
quirements. Pickard later retracted the offer to deposit the





money overseas, noting that it would be illegal. He may not
have realized that the structuring scheme was also illegal.
Five and a half months later, when Pickard's business was on
the verge of collapsing, Rothrock contacted Pickard again, ar-
ranging for several money laundering transactions. Rothrock
told Pickard that the cash came from the smuggling of guns to
South Africa. On one occasion Hollingsworth also received
sting money from Rothrock.
The court held that the defendants were entrapped as a
matter of law because they were not predisposed to commit the
crime when contacted by the government. The court recog-
nized that, under the then prevailing understanding of the word
in the courts of appeals, "predisposition" simply meant "will-
ingness." However, the court found that this definition could
not be reconciled with the Supreme Court's decision inJacobson,
for, "had the Court in Jacobson believed that the legal concept of
predisposition is exhausted in the demonstrated willingness of
the defendant to commit the crime without threats or promises
by the government, then Jacobson was predisposed .... He
never resisted." s
The court relied heavily on the Supreme Court's definition
of entrapment in Jacobson as "the apprehension of an otherwise
law-abiding citizen who, if left to his own devices, likely would
never have run afoul of the law."5 9 "That was Jacobson," stated
the court, for " [h] owever impure his thoughts, he was law abid-
ing. A farmer in Nebraska, his access to child pornography was
limited."'o Since the defendants, left to their own devices, would
also never have run afoul of the law, the Hollingsworth court
found them to have been entrapped.6 1 "Pickard and
Hollingsworth had no prayer of becoming money launderers
without the government's aid."62 The court noted that it would
have arrived at a different result if the defendants had con-
3Id Mat 1199.
" Id. (citing United States v.Jacobson, 503 U.S. 540, 553-54 (1992)).
0Id.
61 Id
62 Id. at 1202.
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trolled an up-and-running bank.63 In such a case, it would have
been reasonably likely that real criminals would have ap-
proached them to launder money.r
Under the market test, the defendants were entrapped, for
almost but not quite the reason given by Chief Judge Posner:
markets have positional attributes, and therefore entrapment
does. The defendants did not have access to the relevant mar-
ket, and there was no reasonable prospect of their gaining it.
Thus, the agent's interactions with them failed to provide in-
formation about their behavior in the real world. As Judge Pos-
ner noted, the result would be different if the defendants had
been the owners of an up-and-running bank.
The difficulty with analyses like this is their potentially ad
hoc nature. That is why we began this section by disclaiming
any strong arguments about the consistency of the cases with
the market test. Nonetheless, the cases can be fitted within the
theory with reasonable ease. By contrast, the existing theories
do not provide explanations at all, but simply comprise conclu-
sory rhetoric tacked on to recitations of the facts. We take this
as further support for the market test.
Lastly, Professor Seidman has argued that "Entrapment doc-
trine ... is ... representative of the adaptive mechanisms to
which we have resorted in order to maintain a criminal justice
system without an adequate theory of blame."6 We may very
well lack an adequate theory of blame, but that is not the cause
of the confusion over entrapment. Individuals who are induced
to commit crimes at extra-market rates do not commit the
harms forbidden by the criminal law. It is not the sale of drugs
63id.
' Id. The Fifth Circuit explicitly adopted the Hollingsworth majority's reasoning in
United States v. Knox, 112 F.3d 802, 808 (5th Cir. 1997), cert. denied 118 S. Ct. 616
(1997). The Ninth Circuit has rejected Hollingsworth's positional requirement.
United States v. Thickstun, 110 F.3d 1394, 1398 (9th Cir. 1997), cet. denied, 118 S. Ct.
305 (1997). The Thirkstun court read Jacobson, not as creating a positional require-
ment, but as applying established law. Id. at 1598. Without explicitly doing so, the
Fourth and Sixth Circuits, in unpublished opinions, also apparently rejected
Hollingswortk United States v. Santos, 64 F.Sd 661 (4th Cir. 1995) (unpublished table
decision); United States v. Zaia, 35 F.Sd 567 (6th Cir. 1994) (unpublished table deci-
sion).
6Seidman, supra note 7, at 151.
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that is the problem, for example. It is instead sale as part of a
system of manufacturing and distribution that leads to specific
harms, from addiction and violence to dead brain cells and bod-
ies. A person who sells at extra-market rates pursuant to an in-
ducement plan is not contributing to the distribution and use of
drugs. 66 When individuals are induced to commit acts, and
those acts actually cause specific harm, such as in cases of vio-
lence, entrapment is not available, 67 which rather plainly con-
firms our point. Such persons are "blameworthy" even if
induced. Entrapment is largely about human frailty in the con-
text of markets-monetary and emotional; it is about the cor-
rupting effect of riches beyond one's reasonable expectations.
Quite to the contrary of Professor Seidman's point, it is about
the limits of social hygienic practices that are not premised on
the blameworthiness of particular acts, whatever the character
may be of the individuals swept into the net.
Regardless of who does the inducing. Private parties will not offer extra-market
prices unless something else is going on than mere participation in the market.
'7 Carlson, supra note 4, at 1067.
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